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International Universities in the Arab World: What is Their Place?
Lisa Anderson
Lisa Anderson is former president of the American University in Cairo, and senior research fellow at New York University Abu Dhabi. E-mail: la8@columbia.edu. A merican universities in the Arab world have long enjoyed a good-humored debate about whether they are in or of the city in which they are located. The American University in Cairo is in the minority; most-the American Universities of Beirut, Sharjah, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example-are of their place. It is not just an American question, although most non-American universities have settled on being in their cities, like the German University in Cairo, while international branch campuses often duck the issue, using a space (NYU Abu Dhabi), colon (Northwestern University: Qatar campus), or an entirely different preposition (Texas A&M University at Qatar).
Beneath the lighthearted terminological dispute is a serious question: what is the place of universities with such explicit international affiliations in the Arab world today?
Where They Come From
The oldest of these institutions reflect a missionary impulse: the American University of Beirut (AUB) began in 1866 as the Syrian Protestant College. Before it was established in 1919, the trustees of the American University in Cairo (AUC) briefly called it Cairo Christian University. By the time AUC opened, however, the explicitly religious purpose of these universities was already giving way to a secular, if paternalistic, commitment to promoting education for moral character and enlightened citizenship.
The middle of the twentieth century saw the establishment of national universities across the Arab world to produce the administrative cadres of new and ambitious states. Private tertiary education was virtually unknown except in Lebanon, and free public higher education became a pillar of the developmental states of the region. Like the states themselves, however, government universities soon grew inefficient, underfunded, and ineffective, failing to meet the needs of the fast growing population. (Ultimately, youth unemployment would be higher in the Arab states than anywhere else in the world, estimated today at more than 30 percent.) In confronting this challenge, as in so much else, governments in the region turned to the private sector: 70 percent of the approximately 600 universities in the region today were established after 1990, and about 40 percent of those are private, accounting for about 30 percent of the region's university enrollments. And, in the era of neoliberal globalization, the private sector turned to the world.
Thus, many of the private universities in the Arab world advertise themselves as attached to, modeled on, or otherwise associated with international establishments. In the United Arab Emirates alone, there are nearly 40 institutions that bear names identifiably American, European, or Australian. Some are cleverly marketed vocational schools and training institutes, but a substantial number are genuine efforts to provide a reasonably good undergraduate education, often drawing on the American liberal arts tradition. Some aspire to support serious graduate and research programs, as their efforts to win international-often American-accreditation attests. Similarly, the establishment of branch campuses, particularly in the Gulf-from the outposts of Carnegie-Mellon's engineering programs and Georgetown's School of Foreign Service in Qatar's Education City, to New York University's branch campus in Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), for example-and ambitious initiatives like Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), would all seem to be promising signs of investment in bringing international faculty, curricula, pedagogy, and governance practices to education and research in the region. X iamen University Malaysia (XMUM) opened in February 2016, describing itself as "the first overseas campus established by a renowned Chinese university and the first Chinese university branch campus in Malaysia." The Malaysian government invited China's ministry of education to establish a branch campus to strengthen bilateral relations. Xiamen University (XMU) was chosen to lead the initiative because its founder, Mr. Tan Kah Kee, was a successful businessman in Malaysia, and the university has well-established programs in Southeast Asia studies and traditional Chinese medicine. XMUM is to be a not-for-profit entity, with any surplus revenues reinvested in research and student scholarships in Malaysia. The project is expected to cost US$315 million and is being financed largely by a loan from the China Development Bank. Private donations helped with initial construction, including a US$30 million gift for XMUM's library.
Context
XMUM is of interest as the first branch campus of a Chinese university and its role as a flagship of China's international engagement strategy in higher education. A late entrant to a region with many branch campuses-nine in Malaysia and 14 in Singapore-XMUM offers some insights into how to attract enrollments in a well-served market-but a market where there have been failures, such as the withdrawals from Singapore of the University of New South Wales and New York University's Tisch School. How XMUM adjusts The most obvious difference between the two campuses is the language of instruction. At XMUM, as required by the Malaysian government's Qualification Agency, most courses are taught in English. The exceptions are two degree programs, Chinese studies and traditional Chinese medicine. On the home campus, most courses are taught in Chinese. By offering classes mainly in English, XMUM has faced difficulties in recruiting faculty from the home campus because not many XMU faculty are proficient in English. To entice faculty to XMUM, it has offered financial incentives and arranged for the main campus to recognize four months of Malaysian service as meeting the requirement of a year's international experience for promotion to full professor at XMU.
The second significant adjustment is the academic calendar. At XMU, student intake occurs in September and most first-degree programs are four years in length, with medicine and architecture being five-year programs. At XMUM, there are two intakes a year, in February and September, and greater variation in program length: arts and social science degrees take three years, while science degrees take four. The differences in academic cycles will constrain student and faculty mobility between the two campuses.
A further difference is the establishment of foundation year programs at the Malaysian campus. With the Malaysian government's approval, XMUM offers one-year science and arts and social science foundation programs. Successful completion will qualify for admission to XMUM undergraduate studies.
There is no foundation year or courses in XMU's undergraduate programs-or in China's public secondary schools. The different level of academic eligibility may further constrain the flow of students from the China campus to Malaysia, and may make it difficult for Chinese high school graduates who enroll at XMUM to be academically successful. These programming decisions may limit the attractiveness of the Malaysian campus for mainland Chinese students.
Similarly, the cost of the Malaysian campus programs may deter students from China, particularly when comparing tuition fees. For example, a software engineering student at XMUM will pay more than seven times the home campus tuition for the same degree. The price difference is the same for international students. It is cheaper for them to study at the main campus in China than at XMUM; humanities majors would pay around US$3,700 annually at the main campus, roughly 50 percent more compared to US$5,600 at XMUM.
To alleviate the price disadvantage, XMUM will offer academic scholarships, needs based grants, and bursaries to enrolled Malaysian students. Until policies for Chinese students and other international students are developed, price will limit the attractiveness of the Malaysian campus. The fee "discount" inherent in need and merit aid will also reduce XMUM's net revenue and impede its path to financial viability.
Conversely, there are some aspects of the academic program that may attract students from China, Malaysia, and neighboring nations. The opportunity for English language immersion is a ready example. For students majoring in Chinese studies, some may be attracted by the reduced emphasis on linguistics in Chinese language and literature courses, and by the absence of compulsory political courses and military training. Others may come for culture-related elective courses like "International Relations of Southeast Asia since WWII."
Students may also be attracted to XMUM by its nine different enrollment pathways. Most of these are to recruit Malaysian students to different undergraduate programs and to accommodate the different assessment schedules in Malaysian secondary schools. XMUM has designed its more flexible admissions policies and practices to make its programs more attractive, to respond to the local environment, and to attract students from neighboring countries. But the Chinese government has limited XMUM's flexibility by requiring Chinese nationals resident in Malaysia to take the gaokao as a path to enrolling at XMUM. Similarly, any mainland resident Chinese student seeking to enter At XMUM, as required by the Malaysian government's Qualification Agency, most courses are taught in English.
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XMUM has to take the "Big Test."
Looking Ahead
While it is too early to assess XMUM's long-term viability, its first steps are informative. The XMU/XMUM partnership illustrates that a branch campus is not a simple mirror site of the home campus. In this case, adjustments have been made to fundamentals like language of instruction, academic calendar and program, admissions policies and practices, and price. Some of these decisions may limit the flow of students from China in general and from the home university. Yet these adjustments, made in response to local context and prevailing educational practices, may impact the longer-term viability of the branch campus.
Foreign Higher Education in India: The Latest Developments richard Garrett
Richard Garrett is director of the Observatory on Borderless Higher
Education. E-mail: richard.garrett@i-graduate.org. I ndia is a classic case of TNE confusion and complexity. TNE refers to "transnational education," higher education institutions or programs from one country established or offered in another. Examples include international branch campuses, joint degrees, or partnerships between local and foreign institutions. Motives on the part of the foreign institution include increased international student recruitment and pursuit of an international identity; while host governments and local partner institutions tend to focus on access to high quality and specialized programming.
The national government in India worries about domestic higher education capacity and quality, and the number of students who study abroad never to return, but is suspicious of foreign providers who offer help. A comprehensive regulatory framework for TNE in India has long been promised. The patchwork of guidance that exists, split across different government agencies, is both frustratingly vague and laboriously detailed. Quite a bit of TNE goes on in practice, but must contend with lack of recognition, poor data, and unpredictable enforcement of the rules. On 23 June 2016, then Human Resource Development (HRD) Minister Smriti Irani unveiled amended regulations for collaboration between Indian and foreign institutions.
The big change is that Indian institutions may now apply directly to have a foreign collaboration approved. Under the old rules, formalized in 2012, the foreign partner had to apply. The minister revealed that not a single foreign institution had filed an application, and blamed perceived bureaucracy. Irani vowed that applications-to the University Grants Commission (UGC), an HRD agency-would be acknowledged within a month and processed within two.
Breakthrough or False Dawn?
An important factor is the kinds of collaboration that are permitted. On that point, the minister announced no change. The 2012 regulations ban forms of TNE that are commonplace elsewhere. Franchising (i.e. a foreign institution allowing an Indian one to offer degrees in its name) is not permitted, nor are joint degrees.
The regulations promote "twinning" programs, where the student in India enrolls at a local institution and spends part of the program on the campus of the foreign partner. But unlike twinning arrangements elsewhere, the student obtains a degree from the Indian institution, not the foreign one. Under the amended rules, the degree transcript may include the name and crest of the foreign partner, but no foreign or joint degree may be awarded.
In another change, the minister said that Indian students associated with a collaboration may now get academic credit if they spend part of their program on the home campus of the foreign institution. Undergraduates who opt for this path must spend at least two semesters overseas. For postgraduate students, the minimum is one semester. The same opportunity is now available for foreign students who want to spend time in India. The two-semester minimum for undergraduates to receive credit may be impractical for many students, in both directions.
Why is the government against joint degrees? The reticence may be due in part to dependence on a regulatory, rather than legislative, route to reform. The government may be of the opinion that the right to award a degree in Number 88: Winter 2017
The national government in India worries about domestic higher education capacity and quality, and the number of students who study abroad never to return, but is suspicious of foreign providers who offer help.
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India is legally restricted to domestic institutions. Short of a new law, which experience suggests is anything but straightforward in India, the government may be limited to tweaking UGC regulations.
A further complication is the role of the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), a parallel body to the UGC. AICTE oversees higher education in "technical" areas, including at degree level. Business, IT, and engineering programs fall under its purview. AICTE has its own rules and approval process for foreign institutions, which permit independent foreign campuses and distance learning, and give no indication that joint degrees are a problem. However, the ten programs approved for 2016/17 are all "twinning" arrangements. The approved programs are from six foreign universities, including DeMontfort and Huddersfield in the United Kingdom and the University of Massachusetts and Valparaiso University in the United States. The list is shrinking-down from 21 approved programs in 2013/14.
Government Inquiry
Bills to introduce foreign providers date back to 1995. The latest, in 2010, the Foreign Educational Institutions Bill, died in Parliament. A recent government inquiry instigated by Prime Minister Modi recommended that foreign institutions be permitted to be set up in India and proposed three ways forward: 1) a new act of Parliament; 2) a redefinition of the university, to encompass foreign institutions; or 3) tweaks to UGC rules on collaboration. If the HRD minister's announcement means the government has gone with option 3, the legal framework for foreign institutions remains ambiguous at best. Ten of India's 29 states recently backed entry of foreign providers, but seven signaled opposition.
There are estimated to be over 600 foreign education providers in India, spanning everything from twinning to faculty exchange and distance learning. According to the recent HEGlobal survey on UK TNE, there are at least nine UK higher education institutions operating in India, offering 82 programs. This contradicts the AICTE list and UGC's assertion that it has approved zero foreign providers. UGC says existing collaborations must obtain approval within a year or face sanctions, but similar deadlines have come and gone with little action. AICTE's "must comply" announcements also appear widely ignored.
In many cases, it is not that foreign providers are deliberately flouting the rules. But rather differing approaches to TNE by the central government and individual states, confusing and overlapping jurisdiction by oversight bodies, and uneven enforcement foster ambiguity about exactly what is permissible.
The latest move by the HRD minister may mean a new flow of applications by Indian institutions interested in collaboration. However, foreign interests may continue to be put off by the inability to award their own degrees, and an approval process that permits UGC to scrutinize "infrastructure facilities, facilities available for instruction, faculty, specified fee, courses, curricula, [and] requisite funds for operation for a minimum period of three years (…)" Much TNE may continue to operate outside the rules, viewing employer enthusiasm as more important than government oversight.
When it comes to foreign higher education, India has yet to find the right balance between regulation and innovation. Until that day comes, the government will experience TNE as a headache rather than a benefit. Recruitment, Integration, and Impact (Yudkevich, Altbach, and Rumbley, Eds., Routledge, 2016) .
International
T he presence of international (i.e., foreign, nonlocal, or nondomestic) faculty within higher education institutions and systems around the world is an important dimension of higher education in the global knowledge society of today. Increased global competition for talent, research, funding, and reputation/profile/branding not only implies that universities must compete for the best and brightest of undergraduate and graduate students, but they must also seek out talented researchers and teachers on a worldwide scale.
The international mobility of faculty is also important in relation to the specific phenomenon of internationalization of higher education. Here, we note that such elements Number 88: Winter 2017
as student mobility, curricular innovations, and the cultivation and maintenance of international partnerships are fundamental aspects of many institutional strategies for internationalization-and in all three areas, faculty are crucial actors.
Yet, the scope and nature of international mobility of faculty-particularly in relation to permanent or long-term appointments, rather than short-term or occasional visits-is a rather unknown and understudied phenomenon. Compared to the long list of reports and studies on international student mobility, there is a surprising lack of data and studies on the phenomenon of international faculty mobility. As we seek to gain an ever-clearer understanding of the dynamics implicit in the global circulation of academic talent (at all levels), it is vital to gain insight into what motivates academics to pursue permanent or long-term appointments abroad, why institutions and systems of higher education hire these individuals, how the relationships between mobile academics and their host institutions play out in practical terms, and what effects are exerted by national and institutional policies relevant to long-term faculty mobility. Indeed, recent research on this subject in which we have been involved-encompassing perspectives from eleven different countries and specific universities-suggests that international faculty mobility is a growing and complex phenomenon, fraught with possibilities and inequalities, and ripe for extensive further exploration and analysis.
Definitional Difficulties and Contextual Complexities
Just as there are a number of different ways in which internationally mobile students are defined or categorized around the world, there is also a lack of consensus with respect to what defines an "international" academic. Is citizenship the defining factor? Or does status as international faculty member have more to do with having received one's academic training (for example, completing doctoral studies) abroad, regardless of country of origin? Is an international faculty member someone who is considered an "immigrant" in the local context-and, if so, does it matter if this process of immigration occurred before or after the faculty member entered the ranks of academia? Without definitional clarity or consistency, it is exceedingly difficult to compare and contrast both quantitative and qualitative information related to this population.
Meanwhile, there are also very different profiles for the institutions recruiting these individuals. On one end of the spectrum, we may find elite research universities with "superstar" attraction status. These institutions are in a position to recruit the world's most sought-after academics and, indeed, consider all faculty searches to be essentially global in nature, as they seek out the best talent from anywhere in the world. Among the scant literature on international faculty mobility, a considerable amount of attention has been paid to these kinds of prestigious institutions. At the other end of the spectrum, however, there are institutions or systems facing local shortages of faculty, which recruit regional or international faculty in order to meet basic operational needs. In between these two extremes, a range of middle-and upper-tier universities may actively be seeking out international academics to some degree, or simply responding as needed to nonlocal job seekers.
How we define international faculty around the world remains inconsistent, and the landscape of institutional settings in which foreign faculty are employed is tremendously diverse.
Concentric Circles of Analysis: National, Institutional, Individual
It is impossible to make generalizations about international faculty mobility without extensive and in-depth analysis over time. However, our research suggests that making sense of the international faculty mobility experience anywhere in the world hinges on an understanding of the distinct, yet interlocking, dynamics of policy and practice at the national and institutional levels, while taking into account the complex realities of the fundamental human experience at the level of individual academics themselves.
At the national level, potential foreign faculty are presented with a set of tangible and intangible factors and options. Whether they will find them attractive or not depends on a multitude of variables. These variables range from the policy framework that actively stimulates (or complicates) their recruitment and legal or professional status in the country, to the aspects of daily life-such as language, cultural norms, and practices-that enable (or inhibit) their integration, to the broader issues of geopolitics and the environment, which can set the overall tone and tenor for their own experience and that of any family members who may accompany them. The national context is therefore a crucial dimension of the international faculty story.
Meanwhile, the lives of internationally mobile faculty are also colored heavily by the circumstances they face within the specific institutional context where they are hired.
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Our research indicates that there is a range of rationales for international faculty recruitment and a wide array of ways in which foreign academics are recruited. Terms of employment can also differ-they may be identical to those offered to domestic faculty, or unique for internationals, with either scenario potentially resulting in challenges and opportunities for all involved. Further, the manner and extent to which the presence of foreign faculty exerts an impact on their host institutions seems rarely explored, documented, or leveraged systematically.
Finally, the story of international faculty mobility is not complete without a consideration of what this phenomenon means at the most fundamental level-that of the individual academic. Here, our research shows that mobile faculty are often motivated by attractive employment opportunities or a sense of duty or desire to contribute to a "larger agenda" that they believe in. They are sensitive to the personal supports that the host institution or country can provide. The universities examined in our study, however, vary widely in terms of systematic provision of such supports.
What We Do Not Know
There is much to explore and yet to understand about the international faculty mobility phenomenon. Some of the key issues we see on the horizon for future research include the way immigration/migration policies affect international faculty mobility; international faculty mobility in developed versus emerging societies, in the public higher education sector versus the private and for-profit sectors, and across disciplines, age, and gender; the impact of online education on international faculty mobility; and the differences in the realities of faculty mobility across various institutional types. For higher education, one UK sector where the relationship with Europe has been unambiguously positive-a win-win for both European countries and the United Kingdom-the consequences will be every bit as destabilizing as was predicted before the vote.
Brexit: Challenges for Universities in Hard Times
Simon Marginson
Blockages to People Mobility
The government of Theresa May has made it clear the era of free people movement between the United Kingdom and the European Union is over. Above all, it was migration resistance that determined the referendum result. There will be a new migration program, in which people of all origins will be treated on a common basis, favoring high-skill migration. In addition, May wants a significant reduction in the overall level of migration into the United Kingdom. The prime minister sees both measures as essential to the political survival of the Conservative Party government.
What happens to EU citizens in UK universities is unclear. Currently there are 43,000 EU staff and 125,000 EU students. However, the Brexit process cannot be completed before March 2019, by which time most current students will be through their courses. While EU staff are likely to retain residence rights, this is still uncertain, as no announcement has been made. Their position may depend on whether reciprocal rights of residence are negotiated successfully for UK citizens presently resident in Europe.
The decision to give priority to closing down EU people movement has momentous consequences, signaling a "hard Brexit" in which the United Kingdom loses access to the single market in Europe. Even partial economic participation in Europe, as in Switzerland and Norway, depends on support for free people movement. A "hard Brexit" directly undermines the UK finance sector in the City of London, the strongest British industry and one of two domains where the United Kingdom is a clear global leader. The other is higher education.
UK-based finance will lose the special "passport" that enables foreign banks and other companies operating in London to access the European market without needing separate licenses for each country. On 18 September, the president of Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank, predicted that many financial services will relocate to Frankfurt. In addition, London will lose its role as a principal trader in euros. The Japanese government has stated it will relocate its banks if the "passport" is lost. Hitachi, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota have large plants in the United Kingdom as their base for accessing Europe. They may also have Number 88: Winter 2017
In order to reduce net migration quickly, the government is considering a large cut in fee-paying international student numbers-30 percent has been floated. Almost one in five of all students in United Kingdom are international. They are classified as temporary migrants. The reduction would be partly achieved by requiring EU students to pay the same fees as non-EU students. Currently, non-EU students pay much higher tuition fees than first degree EU students, who access the same income contingent loans scheme as domestic UK students. It is unlikely that the same number of EU students will continue to flow from, say, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany, given that they have excellent universities in their own countries and in the United Kingdom would have to pay £12,000-20,000 a year in up-front fees.
In addition, a large cut in international students would also affect non-EU international students. Before the last election, Theresa May, then Home Secretary in charge of immigration policy, stated that universities in the United Kingdom should develop new business models with less dependence on revenue from international education. The Home Office will support any cut in numbers by claiming there are high rates of overstay, making a bogey out of international students, though its overstay data are murky.
International students currently supply an estimated £17.5 billion to the UK economy. Any reduction of international student numbers and revenues will be felt most harshly by universities positioned lower down in the status order of higher education, and in the local businesses and provincial cities and towns that service international education.
For international education in the United Kingdom, the only positive is that in the longer term a migration regime prioritizing high skills will encourage graduates to stay on by liberalizing the highly restrictive graduate visa regime. Currently, graduates must be in a job earning at least £35,000 per year, the median wage in skilled UK jobs, to secure a work visa.
Reduced Research Collaboration
It is highly unlikely that UK universities will retain membership of the mainstream European research programs, though there may be continued limited access in some areas. The net effect of retarding people movement and taking the United Kingdom out of combined research teams will be to reduce the flows of knowledge, and weaken both UK and European research. Currently, more than half of all doctoral students in the United Kingdom are foreign born.
Some UK universities, possibly with government support, will make strenuous efforts to build bilateral and university-to-university infrastructure in place of the European research area. Yet bilateral infrastructures are both more expensive overall and unable to deliver the scale of European schemes. Research in Europe taken together matches research in North America. Research in the United Kingdom and one other country does not.
UK universities currently receive £1 billion a year through European programs such as Horizon 2020 and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology. The United Kingdom spends only 0.44 percent of its GDP on research in higher education, well below investments in Northwestern Europe, and 19.7 percent of all UK R&D money is sourced from outside the country, mostly through European funding schemes. This is Europe's second highest level of dependence on international revenues, after Ireland. Any reduction in research resources is likely to be felt especially harshly in leading and middle-level universities. It will trigger increased UK collaboration with the fast-rising research systems of China and East Asia.
Some in UK government are worried about the effects of Brexit in science. Here higher education has its best prospects of compensation. While the international education sector has long called for students to be taken out of the migration target, this now looks unlikely. Cutting international students is disruptive and costly, but much the easiest way to cut total migration-and the government is scarcely likely to exempt the universities from Brexit while it overrides a much more powerful constituency in the City of London.
"Hard Brexit," accumulating migration resistance elsewhere in Europe, and the Trump victory in the United States, signal a new era of politics in which, on a bad day, national security and identity, and deliberate blockages to mobility, can overdetermine global openness, trade, economic enrichment, and the global knowledge society we are building in higher education.
Conflicts in the Middle East from Libya to Afghanistan, the growing US/China tension and the potential flashpoints on the borders encircling China, also suggest a world in 
I
n England, the government has begun the introduction of a new Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) in higher education. Since tuition fees for UK and EU students were increased to a maximum of £9000 from the autumn of 2012, most English higher education providers have ended up charging this maximum. There is a sense in government that these flat fees mask differences in the quality of degree programs that students are being offered. One of the central ideas behind the TEF is that in order for institutions to raise fees in line with inflation, they will need to show that they are offering students a high quality undergraduate education. This will mean that the fees that students are charged will increasingly reflect the quality of the teaching they experience. In addition, it is expected that the TEF will provide students with information that will allow them to make more informed choices about what and where they study; will raise the profile of teaching and ensure that it is better recognized and rewarded; and will lead to higher education better meeting the needs of employers and industry.
How Will the TEF Work?
The TEF will be introduced over a number of years. In year 1, any institution with a positive Quality Assurance Agency Institutional Review is automatically qualified to increase its tuition fees from September 2017. From year 2, institutions will need to opt into the TEF, which will examine a series of metrics: students' views of teaching; assessment and academic support from the National Student Survey (NSS); student dropout rates; rates of employment, including a measure of highly skilled employment; and further study from the Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education (DHLE) survey. While the NSS does give an insight into students' perceptions of their teaching, it is notable that none of these measures tell us directly about the quality of teaching. Rather, these measures are focused on examining the assumed effects of such teaching. Institutions performance will be benchmarked against the demographic characteristics of their students, and based on this, their performance will be flagged when they do statistically significantly better or worse than their benchmark.
Assessors will make an initial assessment of an institution's performance based on the amount of flags they have and then will examine contextual information and an institutional submission of up to 15 pages that outlines the institution's case for the excellence of its teaching. Based on this, they will give the institution a Gold, Silver, or Bronze TEF award. This will provide students with an indicator of the quality of the programs offered by these institutions as whole, rather than the quality of individual programs. In year 2, institutions with each of these awards will be able to raise their fees by the same amount in September 2018. In year 3, the different level of awards will begin to impact on the amount by which institutions can raise fees in September 2019, and there will also be pilots aimed at focusing the TEF down onto individual subjects within institutions. In year 4, it is planned that the subject level TEF will be introduced, and the TEF will also include taught postgraduate students.
Will the TEF Meet its Aims?
In some ways, the TEF will provide students with better information about the quality of their degree programs than what is currently offered by national higher education rankings. While they do not directly tell us about the quality of teaching, there is a logic to the metrics suggested for year 2: it is difficult to imagine an excellent course in which the students think the teaching, support, and assessment are poor; a large proportion of the students leave without graduating; and hardly anyone gets a job or a place on a postgraduate course at the end of it. The commitment to Number 88: Winter 2017 take account of differences in student intake and flag statistically significant differences is a marked improvement on university rankings. Such rankings tend to privilege institutions with more middle-class students and, because they are simply a rank order, differences of many places are usually meaningless in terms of differentiating the quality of what is offered. However, there are issues. First, it is clear that quality resides at the level of particular programs rather than institutions (the same institution can have very good and very poor programs), but students will not get any information about this until at least year 4. Even when they do, initial assessments of the available data suggest that they will not be robust enough to provide meaningful information at this level.
What Will Happen in the Future?
The future of the TEF looks more concerning. It is clear that the government want to increase the number of metrics that are used and have already strongly signaled that they want to develop a metric related to the contact hours that students receive. The problem is that there is simply no evidence that this is a valid measure of teaching quality, while things that we do know are crucial in shaping the quality of teaching, such as the expertise of those who teach, are not even being discussed as potential TEF metrics. If the TEF ends up being based on measures that are unrelated to the quality of teaching, then the danger is that it will be more about institutional game playing than it is about excellent teaching. Focusing on contact hours is particularly problematic, as the most likely outcome is that institutions will redefine what they measure as a contact hour in order to improve their score. This will lead to apparent increases in contact hours without anything changing about students' actual experience. This is the crucial test that any metric must pass: improvements in the score on the metric must only be possible through improvements in quality of teaching that students experience.
The problem appears to be that too little account is being taken of the over forty years of research evidence about what leads to high quality teaching in higher education. This is again reflected in the assessment criteria that underpin the judgements of excellence within the TEF. For example, the assessment criteria that are being used to consider teaching quality (there are other criteria for the learning environment and student outcomes) are a strange mixture of elements: encouraging student engagement; the institution valuing teaching; ensuring courses involve rigor and stretch; and effective feedback on student work. Whilst they might appeal to a common sense notion of what students need, it is difficult to understand the basis on which these were included and others, such as teaching expertise, were excluded. Overall, it is not at all clear how they form a coherent whole that tells us something important about the excellence of teaching or what the view of teaching is that underpins them.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it appears that the TEF has the potential to provide valid information to potential students about the quality of higher education courses at different universities. With students bearing the increasing costs of their degrees, such valid information is crucial. However, this potential is unlikely to be realized unless more account is taken of research into high quality teaching in higher education, and what we know about the ways in which institutions respond to the introduction of performance measures. T hanks to digital technology, today's higher education students and faculty have access to quantities of information that would have seemed like the stuff of science fiction just a few decades ago. Some of this digital information is freely available to anyone, while some is purchased (at considerable expense) by campuses for use by their communities of scholars.
Given the early twenty-first century's wealth of information, it is a fair question to ask: "Are we approaching a time when academic libraries will no longer be necessary?" On the affirmative side of this question, it is easy to imagine a future in which:
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One of the central ideas behind the TEF is that in order for institutions to raise fees in line with inflation, they will need to show that they are offering students a high quality undergraduate education.
•library-managed print collections no longer play much, if any, role in scholarly communication;
•acquiring information resources for a campus becomes a job more suited for a campus purchasing officer than a team of librarian bibliographers. But as easy as such a future is to imagine, it is just as difficult to predict if and when it might become a reality. What we do know with some certainty, however, is how academic libraries have been used over the last decade or so. What the numbers say may be surprising to many.
Academic Library Use in the United States
Circulation of physical items (books, DVDs, etc.) in US academic libraries has been on a steady decline throughout the web era, falling 29 percent from 1997 to 2011. More tellingly, over the same time span and among the same academic libraries, the annual number of circulations (of books, DVDs, etc.) per full-time student dropped from 20 circulations to 10 (down 50 percent).
Electronic scholarly journals have driven their printformat predecessors to obsolescence, if not quite extinction, while e-books have become increasingly plentiful. In 2012, US academic libraries collectively held 252,599,161 e-books. This means that over the course of about a decade, US academic libraries have acquired e-books equal to about onefourth the total number of printed books, bound volumes of old journals, government documents, and other physical items acquired by those same libraries since 1638-the year Harvard College established the first academic library in what is now the United States.
Given only the above numbers, the hasty conclusion would seem to be that everything is online and nobody uses academic libraries any more. But not so fast. Even while circulation numbers were tanking, the data show a steady increase in the number of people actually setting foot in academic libraries: the cumulative weekly gate count for the 60 largest US academic libraries increased nearly 39 percent from 2000 to 2012. Library gate count data for all US institutions of higher education show a similar increase (38 percent) from 1998 to 2012.
Trends in Academic Libraries Outside of the United States
One question raised by the US academic library data is whether or not similar changes are taking place in other countries. While finding current data on academic libraries outside of the United States is easy enough thanks to the Online Computer Library Center's Global Library Statistics, and organizations like the European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation Associations, finding older data in order to see how the use of academic libraries has changed over time is more challenging. Though the countries listed below do not come close to presenting a complete global picture of the academic library, the trends they show are similar to what is seen in US academic libraries. United Kingdom. As in the United States, in the United Kingdom the number of physical items borrowed from academic libraries has declined, dropping 11 percent over the last ten years. In spite of this decline, the number of academic library visits in the United Kingdom has held steady at 55 visits per student, per year, over the last ten years. Canada. Of 26 Canadian academic libraries reporting loans of physical items for both 2000-2001 and 2012-2013 , the total number of loans dropped from 12,492,134 in 2000-2001 to 6,128,543 in 2012-2013 (down 50.94 percent) . Of 21 Canadian academic libraries reporting numbers of visits for both 2000-2001 and 2012-2013 , the total number of visits increased from 18,863,135 in 2000-2001 to 32,798,478 in 2012-2013 (up 73.87 percent) .
So if students are not going to the academic library to access print collections, why are they going at all?
The Lure of the Academic Library I believe that students are trekking to academic libraries because academic libraries have been actively reinventing themselves to meet the needs of today's students.
Besides providing some of the last refuges of quiet in a noisy, distraction-filled world, academic libraries have taken such student-friendly steps as relaxing (or eliminating) longstanding prohibitions on food and drink, providing 24/7 study spaces, and generally recreating themselves to be comfortable and friendly, rather than cold and forbidding. As part of this student-centered trend, academic libraries have been aggressively converting square footage from space to house printed books to space for students to study, collaborate, learn and, yes, socialize.
Given the early 21st century's wealth of information, it is a fair question to ask: "Are we approaching a time when academic libraries will no longer be necessary?"
Examples of how forward-leaning academic libraries are attracting students include the following:
•The Grand Valley State University Library's Knowledge Market provides students with peer consultation services for research, writing, public speaking, graphic design, and analyzing quantitative data. Among a number of specialized spaces, the library offers rooms devoted to media preparation, digital collaboration, and presentation practice.
•The libraries of North Carolina State University (NCSU) offer makerspace areas where students get hands-on practice with electronics, 3D printing and scanning, cutting and milling, creating wearables, and connecting objects to the Internet of Things. In addition, NCSU students can visit campus libraries to make use of digital media labs, media production studios, music practice rooms, visualization spaces, and presentation rooms, among other specialized spaces.
•The Ohio State University Library Research Commons offers not only a Writing Center, but also consultation services for copyright, data management plans, funding opportunities, and human subjects research. Specialized spaces in the library include conference and project rooms, digital visualization and brainstorming rooms, and colloquia and classroom spaces.
Reimagining Libraries
By thinking beyond the book, as they reimagine libraries, academic librarians are adding onto, and broadening a long learning tradition, rather than turning their backs on it. In the words of Sam Demas, college librarian emeritus of Car- A n increasingly visible question facing higher education authorities in countries with advanced data tracking capacity is "what happens to our university graduates?" Answers both justify investments in plant, equipment, and faculty, and reassure students facing otherwise uncertain futures. This article looks briefly at two major approaches to addressing that question, both involving large higher education systems. The first is the "Baccalaureate and Beyond" longitudinal studies program in the United States (hereafter B&B). The second is reflected in the final report of a study of the feasibility and potential design of a survey of European university graduates (download at www.eurograduate.eu). Beyond the potential involvement of 30 countries and 25 languages in Europe, the differences between these approaches are considerable and enlightening.
Before going further, we acknowledge that the US surveys and reports are realities, whereas the European Graduate Survey (hereafter EGS) is a yet-to-be-realized template.
Motivations and Purposes
The US B&B surveys from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) were undertaken in 1993 motivated by (a) the limitations of NCES' previous Recent College Graduates cross-sectional surveys, conducted six times between 1974-1975 and 1989-1990 with a universe of students only one year after receipt of a bachelor's or master's degree, and with heavy emphasis on the future supply of teachers; and (b) as a natural extension of national longitudinal studies begun in secondary school and running for 12-14 years, but with limited capacity for tracking postcollege careers and lives. B&B irons out the former and extends the latter.
The EGS feasibility study, funded by the European Commission, sought a design for an account of the professional and personal life of graduates across the continent in ways that would overcome the inconsistencies of national tracking studies (e.g. the German Tracer Studies Co-Operation Project KOAB in Germany; Alma Laurea in Italy). It involved a more statistically convincing number and type of participants than did previous multinational surveys such as REFLEX (Research into Employment and Professional Flexibility), 1998-2000.
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Structural Differences
The principal characteristics of the EGS, compared to its US parallel, are as follows: First, the US reference points are bachelor's degree recipients only; the European "graduates" include both bachelor's and master's degree recipients, a natural extension of Bologna Process reforms, in an environment where more than half of all bachelor's degree recipients continue to the master's degree. Second, the National Center for Education Statistics in the United States runs single panel B&B surveys for 10 years. The EGS feasibility recommendations are for two simultaneous panels: one retroactive for five years, the other prospective for one, four, and (depending on success, interest, and funding) nine years. The Europeans get immediate retrospection, and potential action going forward. The former is designed to produce commitments to the latter.
The third structural difference, participation and sampling, is more complex. B&B is situated in one country, presented in one language, and uses a universe that is a subsample of the base year's National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS), consisting of those who earned a bachelor's degree in that year. The EGS panels, in contrast, would be drawn de novo from whatever configuration of countries commits to participation (it could be nine; it could be 19), and whatever groups of institutions each country chooses. The US weighting of the B&B sample is simple compared to the variability of country sampling, and two weightings-within country and across participating countries-that Europeans would face. In all such studies, there is an inevitable decline in participation, hence continued reweighting of samples. For example, (from B&B) the same student would be weighted 515.280, 529.535, and 542.523 across three surveys with falling denominators. In the EGS, the same student would carry six weights (three in-country and three pan-European) across three surveys.
Lastly, the issue of funding. There is a single source of fiscal support for B&B. Funding for the EGS would come from individual participating country ministries plus, (if they so choose), international organizations such as the European Commission, OECD, and/or others. Without adequate funding, there will be no EGS, and thus a lost opportunity to create a unified, continental information infrastructure.
Thematic Differences: Self vs. Society
Personal satisfaction is a prime thematic line of the US B&B: satisfaction with a variety of aspects of graduate education (career preparation, time, effort); satisfaction with employment (challenge, benefits, pay, security, working conditions, relationship to courses of study); and satisfaction with personal finances. All these measures are taken with each survey administration. The self is the center of inquiry.
Personal satisfaction is not the center of either surveys or discussion of the contents in the proposed EGS. Instead, a greater stress is placed on larger social units and activities, including engaged citizenship; social/cultural/economic orientation; economic cycles; and social networks. To the extent to which the self appears at all, it is in questions concerning the quality of life, work-life balances, and "trigger events" in the life cycle.
In the matter of labor market experience, B&B concentrates on occupational job type, requirements, location, and personal autonomy and flexibility, along with post-baccalaureate training, including its costs and components (training is not an EGS topic). There is some overlap in the two undertakings' concern with what EGS designers call "quality of employment" components-hours, salary-though EGS is more descriptive and less tied to bald numbers. In addition, the proposed EGS template is structured to tie labor market requirements back to postsecondary experiences at every turn. That is something one does not see in US surveys, despite the groaning of commentators about the failures of undergraduate education. Nor do the B&B variables allow for the EGS distinction between level of skills required on the job, level of skills acquired through education, and level actually used in occupational life, as an approach to frequently moaned "mismatches" in US stocktaking. The EGS distinctions, as its designers emphasized, are those of "sustaining employability."
Parallel Divergences: Individuals and Institutions
While B&B is about individual students, the US Department of Education's annual (since 2013) cross-sectional "Scorecard" underscores the US obsession with individual institutions, presenting data that lead to a rankings mentality. In contrast, "comparison of individual HEIs" ranked 11 out of 11 potential EGS topic categories across all European ministries, rectors' conferences, and research groups surveyed.
The EGS feasibility study, funded by the European Commission, sought a design for an account of the professional and personal life of graduates across the continent in ways that would overcome the inconsistencies of national tracking studies.
Then, under labor market results, fall earnings. Out of 11 topic categories for the texture of an EGS, "returns on education" (a more complex notion than earnings) becomes a complex creature in Europe, as tuition can be $0 in a number of countries, and annual fees range from the nominal to $400. In the EGS design priority surveys, return-on-investment ranked sixth among ministries, seventh among national rectors conferences, and seventh among research groups. This is not a very prominent position for an indicator of future status. European discussants have substituted "earnings" with "assessment of competencies received/acquired on the job," i.e. they regard job-based knowledge and skills to be the equivalent of compensation. In contrast, the one metric on the US "Scorecard" that has vaulted over all others in attention by both institutions and the media is "average personal earnings 10 years after graduation," by institution, however limited and rocky its sources.
In sum, we have two sometimes overlapping, but very different sets of measures tracing the lives of former degree recipients: one highly individualistic, the other far more oriented to broader social settings. The resulting metrics determine the shape of system accountabilities and the tone of assurances to students themselves. W hy is there so little research being done on transnational education (TNE)? TNE, briefly described as "the mobility of higher education programs and institutions/providers across international borders," is still a relatively young sector of higher education provision, but it is growing in scale, scope, and complexity. In many countries, it can provide 10 percent of higher education provision, and in others up to 40 percent. With significant new developments, challenges, and opportunities with TNE, it is time to be better informed about the research and analysis being done on TNE, and to encourage the next generation of researchers to focus on program and provider mobility-not only student mobility.
The purpose of this article is to provide highlights from a recent analysis of more than 300 journal articles, book chapters, reports, and dissertations on TNE published since 2000. The main sources of references were the comprehensive ERIC database and the Australian Council for Education Research IDP Database of Research on International Education. The systematic review coded all academic references as to the type/mode of TNE provision, date of publication, research methodology, major theme, geographic focus, and source of reference. The review focused on various modes of program and institutional/provider mobility and thus did not address student mobility per se. Research on distance education was not included.
The most striking finding is the chaos and resulting confusion as to how different modes of TNE are interpreted and labelled. There are many terms used in the literature and practice to describe the same TNE mode. Conversely, one term applies to many different types of TNE. The inconsistent use of terms makes comparisons of TNE provision and research within and across countries challenging and often inconclusive. It also means that generalization of research findings is difficult and the analysis of internationally comparable TNE data questionable.
Modes of TNE-International Branch Campus, Partnership Programs, Joint Universities, Franchise
Given the inconsistency in TNE terminology, each reference was carefully reviewed and eventually categorized as to mode of program and provider mobility. The result reveals the following distribution of TNE research references: international branch campuses (IBCs), 29 percent; partnership programs (involving collaboration between host and sending countries such as twinning and joint/double degree program), 16 percent; joint universities (binational, cofounded, and codeveloped institutions), 6 percent; franchise programs (export programs from sending countries), 5 percent; and multi-mode/generic TNE research, 43 percent. Clearly, more research is focused on IBCs than on other modes. When geographic focus is factored in for IBCs, it shows that research from the viewpoint of the sending countries is most prevalent, and research from the host country perspective significantly underrepresented. With TNE representing a growing percentage of higher education in host countries, it is worrisome that there is little TNE research from the host country point of view.
Major Themes
Each reference was coded for the primary topic addressed. Ten major themes emerged from this analysis. The results show that about 28 percent focused on management and development issues; 15 percent on trends and challenges; 12 percent on quality assurance; 10 percent addressed policies/regulations; 10 percent student issues; and only 5 percent each faculty perspectives, outcomes and impact, pedagogy and curriculum, rationales, and definitions. While it is encouraging to see the focus on management issues and quality assurance, it is troubling that outcomes and impact, as well as pedagogy and curriculum, receive such little attention. When the themes are linked with TNE modes, the quality assurance research focuses primarily on TNE in general and is not specific to one of the four main TNE modes. This raises the vexing question as to how quality assurance practices and issues differ among the modes. For example, with IBCs and franchise programs, the curriculum, qualification offered, and external quality assurance are the primary responsibility of the sending country. However, for partnership programs, the responsibility for these three aspects involves both the sending and host countries.
Research Methods
The type of research methods (empirical, descriptive, conceptual, and policy analysis) was noted for all references. Overall, descriptive methods were used for 52 percent of the references, empirical for 40 percent, conceptual for 8 percent, and policy analysis for 1 percent. Interesting to note is the very small percentage of research studies that are conceptual or theoretical in approach. This may shed light on why there is such inconsistency in the interpretation and use of TNE terms.
Dates and Sources of References
It is promising to see the considerable increase in TNE research references during the last 15 years. Of the total references reviewed, only 7 percent were published from 2000 to 2005, but this increased substantially to 42 percent between 2006 and 2010, and to 50 percent from 2011 to 2015. A deliberate choice for the review was to include academic literature only, thereby excluding grey literature such as newspaper/newsletter articles and blogs. With TNE research still being a relatively young field, it is not surprising that there is more grey literature than academic literature. But because the analysis focused on TNE research, it was necessary to focus on traditional sources. The analysis shows that about 39 percent are book chapters, 39 percent journal articles, 15 percent reports, usually from commissioned research, and only 7 percent dissertations.
It is disappointing to find so few PhD dissertations, as these researchers are critical to the future analysis of TNE. TNE dissertations available on ProQuest appear in references starting from 2005. The majority (61 percent) of the 18 dissertations focus on IBCs. This is interesting, as currently there are about 250 operating IBCs around the world, while there are thousands of TNE partnership programs. Furthermore, the emergence of joint universities (which involves collaboration from both host and sending country institutions to establish a new institution) is a relatively new phenomenon and is worthy of more research, as they are radically different from IBCs, which are essentially satellite campuses of foreign parent institutions. All in all, TNE studies would benefit from more PhD students, especially in host countries, doing their research on the different modes and dimensions of TNE.
TNE is still a relatively young sector and certainly an underresearched one. There are probably three to four times more research publications on student mobility issues than on program and provider mobility topics. However, a first key step is to develop a "Common TNE Classification Framework," with terms and definitions which are robust enough to differentiate the major modes of TNE, but flexible enough to be used by the more than 100 host and sending countries increasingly involved in TNE. This is a fundamental step to improving TNE data collection and research. A re there common elements in the higher education realities of Southeast Asia? In fact, the region may even be more divergent than convergent. This can be seen in the The purpose of this article is to provide highlights from a recent analysis of more than 300 journal articles, book chapters, reports, and dissertations on TNE published since 2000.
responses that the countries in the region have made to twenty-first century higher education challenges, and such an examination yields some useful lessons and models.
Aspects of Diversity
The region is diverse in almost every respect. Religious traditions include Muslim (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei), Christian (the Philippines), Confucian (Vietnam), Buddhist (Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos), and mixed (Singapore)-with religious minorities in most countries. British, French, Spanish, American, and Dutch colonialism have influenced the region. One country, Thailand, is one of the few in the developing world that was never colonized. Wealth varies dramatically from several high-income countries (Brunei and Singapore), some middle-income (Malaysia, Thailand), several that are close to middle-income (Indonesia, Vietnam, and perhaps the Philippines), and several that are still developing (Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos). Thus, it is not surprising that the variations in higher education realities across the region are significant-in many ways there are more differences than similarities. This is understandable, as each country needs a different approach to higher education development to meet specific national needs.
Higher Education Realities
Access to postsecondary education varies considerably in Southeast Asia-from approximately 10 percent in Myanmar to 87 percent of the relevant age group in Singapore. No Southeast Asia country, except Singapore, enrolls postsecondary students at the levels of the most advanced countries. Thailand (around half), Malaysia (37 percent), and Indonesia (32 percent) come closest. The poorer countries, such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, are all under 20 percent gross enrollment ratios. The region, with one exception, still faces the overwhelming pressures of massification-access to postsecondary education for large cohorts of students.
It is not surprising that the region has very few globally recognized research universities. With the notable exception of Singapore, which has two universities in the top 100, none rank highly, and only 15 are listed in the top 800 of the Times Higher Education ranking of universities worldwide. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, along with Singapore, are represented. While these rankings are imperfect measures, they do indicate generally the standing of research universities globally. The fact that the region has few research universities is a serious disadvantage if it wants to participate at the top levels of global science, attract students and scholars from overseas, and in general be a serious player in the global knowledge economy.
Again, with the exception of Singapore and to some extent Malaysia, investment in higher education in Southeast Asia has been modest-in general expenditure from government sources has been under the support levels of advanced countries. Only Singapore and Malaysia have provided higher levels of state investment in higher education-other countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, spend well under 1 percent of GDP on postsecondary education. These relatively low levels of investment have had important implications. There are few research universities in Southeast Asia, as has been pointed out. It has also meant governments' response to the needs of massification has been limited, and that the private sector has provided much of the facilities to absorb the demands of mass access.
The private sector has emerged as a key part of the postsecondary structure in much of Southeast Asia. Singapore, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, Brunei, and Malaysia are partial exceptions to this generalization, although all have active and growing private institutions. In Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia, private providers enroll more than half of the student population. In the Philippines, more than 80 percent of students are in private universities. Even socialist Vietnam plans to have 40 percent of enrollments in the private sector by 2020, although it is hard to see how that could be achieved without significantly lowering quality. In general, the private institutions are "demand absorbing," as countries transition to mass higher education-accepting students with modest academic qualifications and often from families from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Many of the private providers are for-profit, and very few are high quality. In Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, there are a few prestigious private universities, often affiliated with Christian religious organizations. Overall, little is known about the large and quite important private higher education sector in Southeast Asia.
Few Southeast Asian countries have coherent and welldesigned academic systems that provide a range of academic opportunities. Few countries, in Southeast Asia or elsewhere, have figured out how to integrate the private higher education sector so that it can contribute coherently to the public interest. Further, even within public postsecondary education, there are seldom systems in place that effectively ensure that the various sectors intelligently interlock, so that research universities, teaching-focused institutions, vocational schools, and others work together and are logically funded. Singapore, again, is perhaps an exception to this trend. It has just recently appointed a cabinet minister with a portfolio for higher education and skills.
Issues and Debates
Is there a "Southeast Asian model" for higher education development? With the diversity described here, the answer is negative. Yet, there are a range of higher education networks, including the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO); the Association of Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning (ASAIHL), which includes institutions from all over Asia; and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN+3), that discuss common issues that may be considered in a regional context, and aspects of cooperation that may be useful. However, few lasting regional initiatives have been developed, and the desire to retain national control tends to override regional ambitions.
With few exceptions, and despite the existence of ASEAN and several other regional organizations, there is surprisingly little accurate information or analysis concerning higher education in the region. Accurate and up-to-date statistics and careful analysis of key themes and issues are necessary prerequisites for effective policymaking. Without good information, within countries and regionally, effective benchmarking is impossible. No Southeast Asia nation has an internationally visible higher education research center, and there are very few higher education specialists, whether in government or in the universities. A partial exception is Malaysia's IPPTN (National Higher Education Research Institute Malaysia). There is an urgent need for a research and policy community in higher education.
The language of higher education is a continuing issue in Southeast Asia, as it is in much of the world. The role of English, as the main world language of science and scholarship, is a particular dilemma. In general, Southeast Asian nations use their own indigenous languages for higher education. Two major exceptions are Singapore and the Philippines, which use English-as does Myanmar-although there is discussion in Myanmar concerning the appropriate language. Multiethnic Singapore found English to be a logical choice from the time of independence in 1965-a choice that helped the country build the most successful higher education system in Southeast Asia, and the only one with high international standing. Malaysia chose to jettison English and shift to the use of bahasa Malaysia, a decision that prevented the country from becoming internationally prominent, and created other problems. In the 2000s, Malaysian policy swung back to English to some extent, but now seems to be shifting again-although private sector institutions continue to offer instruction in English. Indonesia moved from Dutch to bahasa Indonesia following independence, although some English is now used.
The issue of language is discussed here not only because it is important in and of itself, but also because it is symbolic of the complexities of policy in the region. Language is, in some countries, a contentious political issue. On the one hand, local languages are a repository of local culture and history. On the other, English helps shape internationalization as well as regionalization, possibilities for hiring talent and attracting students from abroad, links to global science, prospects for access of local students, and others.
Few Southeast Asian nations seem to be positioned in the near future to join the ranks of the top leagues in higher education. Most continue to be concerned with coping with the continuing demands of massification, and thus pay limited attention to the global knowledge economy-with the significant exception of Singapore and to some extent Malaysia. No Southeast Asia country has sponsored an "excellence initiative," as have been initiated in such countries as China, Germany, Japan, Russia, and others, as a way of quickly building top research-focused universities-although most of the countries in the region have provided at least modest additional resources to their flagship universities. Malaysia, and particularly Singapore, have invested significant resources in them.
Southeast Asia is clearly affected by international trends. However, few countries have an international perspective or an internationalization policy. Malaysia, for example, hosts several branch campuses of Australian universities-and has one local university, the International Islamic University Malaysia, that was established to serve students from abroad. And Singapore, through its Global Schoolhouse initiative, has had an active internationalization policy that includes attracting international students and overseas academic institutions as well. But the region in general lacks an international perspective.
Conclusion
While there is little that links Southeast Asia's diverse nations, there are common higher education realities that face them. But rather than thinking of the region as a whole, it may be more useful to think of groups of countries with similar challenges. A first step is to develop effective data and analysis, and then to consider carefully appropriate development strategies. While problems are national, solutions may be regional, and answers may be suggested by the experiences of countries and institutions in the region. W ith Myanmar's economic and democratic transition in rapid progress, the higher education sector needs to reengineer itself. The November 2015 elections gave its mandate to a National League for Democracy (NLD) government. Efforts have to be made to enact higher education and private education laws, incorporate citizenship education, and increase engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Evolving Education Legislation
After 50 years of isolation, neglect, and underinvestment, Myanmar's higher education infrastructure (e.g. buildings, libraries, and laboratories), curriculum, research, and teaching capacity require substantial renovation, investment, and capacity building. Of the 170 public higher education institutions, under 13 different ministries, that comprise Myanmar's higher education, almost half are situated in Yangon (33) and Mandalay (36), and only 10 universities can confer doctorate degrees. Furthermore, a significant number of these institutions actually offer vocational training or distance education, raising quality issues.
To address some of these issues, Myanmar's national education law was enacted in October 2014. It was amended in June 2015 to incorporate the demands of protestors (e.g. students and civil society organizations), which slowed progress in drafting its subsector laws for higher and private education. Key higher education issues addressed in the law include the extent of university autonomy, the right to organize unions, and the university's right to formulate its own curriculum. Given the changing nature of higher education stakeholders, and the country's development needs, enacting and amending the national education law has been an evolving process characterized by inclusiveness, openness, and to a certain extent transparency, which are key features of a democratic government.
Transparency and good governance through a set of legal frameworks, and their implementation, help enhance the country's higher education reputation, especially with a clear higher education mandate including increased access, equity, quality, and relevance. Aside from economic considerations, however, Myanmar needs to consider its nation-building requirements and the contribution of higher education, through citizenship education, to ensure sustainable development and transition to democracy.
University-led Initiatives?
In spite of the uncertainty deriving from the absence of a higher education law, universities will be granted a degree of institutional autonomy, especially as they have been tasked to draft charters. Universities are under pressure to support the demands of a fast growing economy driven by local economic development and increasing direct foreign investment in the country's different sectors, including higher education.
Myanmar's higher education sector is now charged with the responsibility of producing enough graduates with the required skills, knowledge, and attitudes demanded by an economy increasingly connected to the global market. Universities need to reengineer themselves and their curriculum, to effectively conform to the requirements of Myanmar's fast changing economic and social environment. Within the proposed institutional autonomy framework, universities need human and financial resources along with much needed infrastructure, to effectively deliver globally skilled and competent human resources required by industry. Furthermore, quality standards need to be established through a national qualifications framework and an independent national quality assurance agency aligned with ASEAN and international practices.
Myanmar's universities, however, lack the capacity to undertake these changes, especially within an unfamiliar environment and a fairly new and vague institutional autonomy framework. Half a century of isolation and a constant lack of investment have taken their toll on the capacity of higher education institutions to adapt to regional and global standards and to the rapid changes of the country's economic and social environment. Although the international development community has contributed with technical assistance, capacity building, and even infrastructure development, a truly national higher education sector needs to take into consideration its own traditions, context, and needs, rather than transplant foreign models.
In addition, Myanmar universities need to engage in citizenship education to support social development, by inculcating the rights and responsibilities required to be a Myanmar, ASEAN, and global citizen. Under the above context and development, "proactive learning," which focuses on interactive and participatory learning led by faculty members, may provide an effective method to nurture citizenship and employability among students, and narrow the Number 88: Winter 2017 gap between the provision of higher education, the requirements of industry, and the country's economic and social development needs.
Using ASEAN and International Frameworks
Myanmar needs to conform to the requirements of its membership in ASEAN, and utilize its advantages. Aside from increasing regional economic integration, ASEAN, through the ASEAN University Network and SEAMEO RIHED (Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization/Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development), has taken a significant number of higher education initiatives that should help its member countries' higher education systems reach regional and international standards. These programs include establishing national qualifications frameworks, which will be referenced to the ASE-AN Regional Qualifications Framework by 2018; setting up the ASEAN Quality Assurance Network; and developing an ASEAN Credit Transfer System. These higher education developments at the regional level do not stand alone. Other bilateral and multilateral higher education engagements also provide support for capacity development, infrastructure improvement, and guidance in international best practices. However, ASEAN provides a significant and tested framework in line with its policy of narrowing the developmental gap between its member countries, a strong regional basis for higher education cooperation, and a directive to establish not only the ASEAN Economic Community, but also the ASEAN Community, in the near future.
Higher education can be key to supporting the country's economic development and democratic transition. However, legal frameworks must be established and implemented, even if this remains an ongoing process. Support must be given to higher education institutions, especially within the proposed institutional autonomy framework, and universities need to be actively engaged in citizenship education to enhance nation building, reduce internal conflicts, and support the democratic transition. Finally, Myanmar's active engagement in ASEAN higher education initiatives provides support for capacity building, quality enhancement, mutual recognition, and, in time, meeting ASEAN higher education standards. Transparency, inclusion, and good governance remain key factors to improving Myanmar's higher education sector.
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T here is little research into the institutional/organizational underpinnings of education systems. Take, for example, the frequent phenomenon of mergers and demergers of education ministries. Many countries have several ministries of education: one for basic and secondary education (sometimes even one for each); another for higher education; yet another for vocational education. Over time, these ministries are merged, demerged, and reconfigured with sufficient frequency to provide ample meaning to the quote "it's déjà vu all over again" (and again and again).
Even though ministerial mergers and demergers are fairly common and pose similar challenges to all concerned, we were surprised to find only one study (in Zimbabwe) that directly addresses the issue. Studies on the reorganization of government structures are plentiful, but they do not address the particular issues of merger/demerger in education. And yet the abilities of education systems to meet expectations can be cruelly dependent on their organizational capabilities. In education, in particular, policy usually ends up being evaluated as implementation, and implementation is the work of organizational structures at all levels.
Malaysia: A Case Study
In Malaysia, the ministry of higher education (MoHE) was Number 88: Winter 2017
After 50 years of isolation, neglect, and underinvestment, Myanmar's higher education infrastructure (e.g. buildings, libraries, and laboratories), curriculum, research, and teaching capacity require substantial renovation, investment, and capacity building. The ministry of education (MoE) and the MoHE were merged in 2013. The reasons provided included: spurring the transformation of education to be on par with international standards by 2020; progress toward one administrative roof for the whole system; harmonization of education strategic plans; improved strategic management of the education system. Two years later, in 2015, the single ministry was again divided into its two previous components, the MoE and the MoHE. This was justified by claiming that separation would allow the MoHE to better focus on empowering higher education in order to meet the rising demands of its institutions. According to senior staff at both ministries, the 2013 merger and the 2015 demerger were politically motivated and unexpected-all interviewed stated that both decisions took them by surprise.
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The merger lasted for only two years and its effects were minimal. Three factors account for this: (i) the important functions of accreditation and examinations supervision are performed by autonomous agencies and, thereby, are insulated from ministerial institutional changes; (ii) university autonomy, which insulates the universities from politically motivated vicissitudes; and, of course (iii) the short duration of the merger-if it had lasted longer, the effects would have been greater and a subsequent demerger more difficult. Nonetheless, efforts were made toward consolidation of the two ministries, especially during the second year after the announcement of the merger.
The Merger as Seen by Ministerial Staff
Notwithstanding the unexpectedly short duration of the merger, staff of the two former ministries gave serious thought to its implementation and to potential benefits and costs. Staff from the former MoE perceived the benefits as follows: facilitation of information-sharing, resulting from improved ease of obtaining advice from university faculty and researchers; economies of scale in human resource management; and sharing of infrastructure. On the other hand, MoE staff saw several potential problems associated with the merger: the renegotiation of some international agreements to include higher education; the difficulty of budget planning; confusion resulting from the (presumably short-term) duplication of human resources, accounting, and legal departments during the merger period; and loss of exclusive focus on K-12 education.
For the MoHE, the merger provided one major advantage-coincidental and unintended, according to all interviewed-which was that it greatly enhanced the formulation of its ten-year strategic plan (Malaysia Education Blueprint 2015 -2025 . The short merger period facilitated this by allowing for: improved access to information; a better understanding of the complexities of the basic education system as a whole; a broader ownership of the higher education Blueprint; the identification of overlapping activities, such as technical and vocational education and training; and the definition of key performance indicators.
On the downside, according to MoHE staff, decision chains lengthened and the merged ministry was perceived as too big and difficult to manage. There were too many meetings, leading to greater stress. Most importantly, the budget for higher education declined under the merger.
The merger also highlighted the very different institutional cultures of the two ministries. For example, decisionmaking processes in the MoHE were more flexible and informal than those of the MoE; information and decisions in the MoHE tended to circulate more as soft copies, whereas the MoE used hard copies; and MoHE staff were often on secondment from other (usually university) positions and/ or on limited-term contracts, meaning that there was more staff turnover in the MoHE than in the MoE.
Conclusion
Both the 2013 merger and the subsequent 2015 demerger were politically motivated and came as a surprise to all frontline actors in the ministries. Little organizational change occurred during the two years of the merger period, with the first year mostly spent on getting to know new areas, procedures, and staff, and the second year on working toward implementation. In the event, all agree that the merger did not change much; however, if it had continued for a longer period, reversal would have been difficult and painful. Also, there was broad agreement that management was smoother and more efficient before the merger, and improved again after the demerger.
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Even though ministerial mergers and demergers are fairly common and pose similar challenges to all concerned, we were surprised to find only one study (in Zimbabwe) that directly addresses the issue.
We found no clear, unambiguous support for the merger. One benefit that surprised senior staff working on higher education was that the merger facilitated the formulation of the higher education ten-year strategic plan. However, now that the Blueprint has been completed and adopted, those concerned find that separation is preferable for implementation and focus.
The potential institutional instability resulting from the merger (or, for that matter, from any reorganization of government structures) was mitigated by the existence of autonomous agencies performing major functions, as well as by the fact that the universities are autonomous.
Perhaps the most surprising finding of our work is the near-total absence of any systematic analysis of the frequent phenomenon of ministerial mergers and demergers in the sector of education. Does this lack of interest constitute a recognition that mergers/demergers are of little consequence, or, rather, does it point to a general lack of concern for the institutional, organizational, and managerial dimensions of the sector? The latter would be highly worrisome given the developmental, social, financial, and political importance of the education sector. As many IHE articles over recent years testify, private higher education (PHE) has grown immensely worldwide. Although most of the articles have dealt with PHE rather generically, others have focused on some particular type of PHE. This Special Focus section highlights Christian higher education (CHE). The section's geographical coverage is broad, as both this introductory piece and Glanzer's piece are global in scope, and Carpenter's is regional (Africa).
Christian Higher Education's Place within Private Higher Education
Daniel Levy
CHE in this Special Focus refers mostly to contemporary growth, international settings, and Protestant as well as Catholic institutions. (Orthodox Christianity has not much joined the move into higher education.) Although the Special Focus pieces find variation within CHE (by region, country, and institution), they also identify enough defining CHE realities to make CHE a viable category for analysis.
To open the Special Focus section, this introductory piece places CHE within the context of PHE. More specifically, it indicates how CHE is a type of "identity" PHE. By far the most common form of identity presence in higher education is religious, though ethnic and women's colleges also have a presence. In the nineteenth, and late into the twentieth century, the growing religious type was often Catholic. But the Protestant component of the contemporary CHE surge augments the pluralist nature of the religious proliferation. (Some echo is heard on the growth of Islamic colleges and universities, though these are often public as well as private and, in any case, are beyond the scope of this Special Focus.)
The coherence of the CHE category manifests itself in two vital elements at the forefront of each of this Special Focus's articles: growth and challenges.
Growth
Like other identity institutions, CHE institutions emerge to foster the interests of a group. There is a strong promotional side, but also often a defensive side, as a secularizing society and higher education system threaten (intentionally or not) the religious presence in higher education. Even a majority among the general population may find itself only a small minority force in a country's public higher education sector. The religious motivation for growth may be rather narrow, or broadened to include social missions such as serving the poor. Alongside distinctly religious motivations, however, religious higher education institutions sometimes grow from dynamics found also in PHE's nonidentity sectors. From their outset, most religious institutions declare academic missions as well. Over time, CHE institutions seek to build enrollment for the tuition it brings, while governments push them to help expand higher education access. On the other hand, some academically and socially privileged CHE institutions grow as students escape the political and other problems that plague the public sector in many countries. Thus, in CHE as in identity institutions generally, growth comes from a combination of distinctive group causes and nondistinctive causes, seen elsewhere in PHE.
"Academic drift," that common higher education reality in which institutions ascend in their level (including ascension upward into higher education), plays itself out in vivid form in CHE. Seminaries or other institutions training religious leaders and concentrating on theology, become universities offering nonreligious fields alongside religious ones. The motivation may be to reach out to sociNumber 88: Winter 2017 ety or marry faith and science, but it may include financial, expansionist, or status motivations widely at play in private (and public) institutions.
The contemporary surge of CHE is part of the broader ongoing PHE surge, but not of a generalized religious surge. Catholic higher education, in parts of the world the most important identity type in the ninteenth and twentieth centuries, has been more in descent than ascent. The Catholic wing of today's CHE surge is largely in new institutions and in regions (Africa looming large here), with only a small prior Catholic or other private presence. In Latin America, contrasts between traditional Catholic universities and new Protestant or Evangelical ones are striking.
The extent of the global CHE surge is difficult to quantify-in particular in enrollment. The phenomenon is exaggerated by the striking number of institutions, as many of them, especially Protestant ones, are small. Nonetheless, authors can point to more than a few large CHE institutions. The CHE surge is more potent in the developing than developed world, notwithstanding important exceptions in Japan and South Korea.
Challenges
Unfortunately for the CHE institutions, they are vulnerable to two major kinds of challenges. One kind is rather general to PHE institutions. The other is especially fundamental to identity institutions. Both threaten enrollment size, but the latter especially threatens dilution of core mission.
Just as CHE grows from some causes similar to those behind other PHE growth, so it is vulnerable to challenges that face most PHE institutions, with particulars sometimes involving religion. A national swing to the political left may bring increased regulation and even hostility, especially where the left sees religion as regressive or at least basically irrelevant to higher education. CHE legitimacy may be shaky on grounds of both academic quality, as is common for PHE, or isolation from unifying public national missions. Finance is a common threat for private institutions and, as is common with identity institutions, most CHE institutions get little or no public funding. Academic drift stemming from aspirations to meet quality and status expectations pushes against focused priority on original religious mission.
At the same time and in several ways, the very forces that lead to distinctive CHE growth hold seeds of potential challenges. A diminishing Christian population, but also one with diminished fealty to religion, is a direct threat. As CHE institutions then reach out to meet enrollment and faculty needs, they must expect an accelerated dilution of mission.
The general challenges to PHE and the particular challenges to identity institutions like CHE institutions are formidable. Nonetheless, CHE in recent decades has brought a surge of largely fresh identity institutions, providing some renewed energy to the private sector. or its first 600 years of existence, virtually all of Western higher education was faith-based. Over the past two centuries, however, nation-states moved faith-based higher education to the margin, as they became the most powerful secularizing force affecting higher education. As a result, faith-based higher education has faced challenges from governments, but it also continues to experience growth on the margins when certain conditions are available.
Growing on the Margins: Global Christian Higher Education
What are the particular challenges facing the over 1,100 Christian colleges and universities in the world today? I define as "Christian" those universities or colleges that currently acknowledge and embrace a Christian identity (Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, or Protestant) and purpose in their mission statements, and shape aspects of their governance, curriculum, staffing, student body, and campus life in the light of that identity. I also define university to mean degree-granting institution with more than ecclesiastical or technical majors, and not a specialty institution, such as a theological seminary.
Contemporary Challenges
The most obvious challenge to Christian universities comes from the nationalization of higher education systems. In
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There is a strong promotional side, but also often a defensive side, as a secularizing society and higher education system threaten (intentionally or not) the religious presence in higher education. most countries, a central ministry of education or some other government entity controls the authorization of degree granting and determines the legal framework for higher education. In authoritarian countries, such as in communist countries or military dictatorships, the state often promotes a purely secular public education and outlaws private forms of higher education, or highly regulates it-which then includes religious universities.
Even in democracies, the nation-state also shapes faithbased higher education in important ways. For example, since most democracies do not have an established religion, they tend not to support religious institutions financially. According to our research, only 7 percent of Christian universities receive the majority of their funding from the state. These institutions are usually in Europe (e.g., Belgium, England, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia) or have some association with the British Commonwealth (e.g., Australia). Furthermore, only 15 percent of Christian universities receive partial direct funding from the state, again a phenomenon concentrated in Western and Central Europe (e.g., France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, and Portugal), with India an important developing country example. Overall, Christian institutions around the world are now overwhelmingly privately funded and will likely remain so in the near future.
In countries where Christian universities are growing the most, it is largely due to new freedom for privately-funded universities more generally. For example, of the 71 Christian colleges and universities we identified that started outside of North America since 1995 (47 of which began in Africa), only four received some sort of government funding. Even in countries such as India, where Christian colleges receive government support, an increasing number of the new institutions are privately funded institutions. As a consequence, Christian universities prosper in countries that allow a large degree of privatization, as in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and the United States, while they are virtually nonexistent in countries with very little by way of private universities, such as Austria, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
Remarkable Growth
Despite these challenges of self-financing, Christian universities continue to be created. Outside of North America, the current center of Christian higher education, at least 130 new universities have been created since 1990. Not surprisingly, most of the growth has come from countries where private education overall has expanded. Here are some highlights of the current creativity:
•Africa has been a hot spot, with 58 new Christian colleges and universities (16 Catholic and 42 Protestant) founded between 1990 and today. The largest of these institutions, the Saint Augustine University of Tanzania, founded in 1998, already has over 12,500 students.
•In Latin America, 30 new Christian universities have arisen since 1990, 11 of them Protestant. The largest is the Catholic University of Honduras, founded in 1992, with over 17,000 students.
•In Asia, 22 institutions have been created since 1990 (eight Catholic, 14 Protestant). The largest number started in India (12). While most of the Indian colleges are small, some of the universities in other countries have grown quickly. For example, Baekseok University in South Korea, which started in 1994, has grown to over 15,000 students.
•In Europe, the main action has been in the formerly communist nations, where 14 of the 17 Christian universities have been established or resurrected since 1990 (six Catholic, three Orthodox, seven Protestant and one joint ecumenical partnership between Anglicans and Catholics). In contrast, there are only three recently founded Christian universities in Western Europe. The largest is the publicly funded Catholic University in Ružomberok (Slovakia) with 7,700 students.
•Oceania has seen the creation of only two new universities. Both of them, however, are the largest Christian universities in each country (Australia and Papua New Guinea). The state-funded Australian Catholic University, a product of the merger of four preexisting Catholic institutions, is now the largest Christian university in the area with an enrollment of almost 32,000 students.
A few other generalizations can be made about this new and ongoing growth. Virtually all of it comes from the Catholic (51) and Protestant (79) tradition, and not the Eastern Orthodox (three). Outside of Africa, most of the Protestant universities tend to be much smaller than the Catholic universities (e.g., the average size of the new Catholic institutions in South America is 2,902 students, while the average size for the Protestant is 1,305). Africa is the exception, where the average size for both Catholic and Protestant institutions is virtually the same (Catholic 2,395; Protestant 2,382). Not surprisingly, the largest universities are almost all state-funded to some degree and accept students regard-
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In countries where Christian universities are growing the most, it is largely due to new freedom for privately funded universities more generally.
less of religious identity, while the smaller institutions are privately funded and perhaps more selective with faculty hiring or even admissions. Overall, although Christian universities no longer lead higher education, where nationstates allow it, they still grow. In some senses, they grow on the margins, but then these margins are not so small or insignificant.
Christian Universities Grow in Africa
Joel Carpenter
Joel Carpenter is professor of history and director of the Nagel Institute for the Study of World Christianity at Calvin College, US. E-mail: jcarpent@calvin.edu.
C hristian higher education is growing briskly in sub-Saharan Africa. It exists at the intersection of two of the most dynamic social trends on the continent: the rapid rise of Christian adherence and the volatile growth of higher education.
A century ago, only nine million Christians resided in all of Africa, and most were in Egypt's and Ethiopia's ancient churches. By 1950, this number had tripled, to about 30 million. By 1970, there were 114 million Christians in Africa. Today there are an estimated 555 million African Christians-Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal, and African-instituted.
African higher education's growth has also been rapid. In the early 1960s, there were only 41 higher education institutions and 16,500 students in all of Africa. As of 2010, sub-Saharan Africa enrolled 5.2 million students in 668 higher education institutions, and these enrollments were more than double those in 2000.
African universities today are emerging from a turbulent half-century. The immediate postcolonial era brought high hopes with supportive governments and massive international investments. But by the 1980s, African universities were suffering deep financial cuts as falling commodity prices and inflated energy prices crippled national budgets. World Bank and International Monetary Fund advisors pushed debtor nations to reallocate educational spending toward primary and secondary schools. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes suspected flagship universities of subversion and slashed their budgets. By the 1990s, even the finest African universities were in crisis.
To compound these problems, the growth of secondary education drove a relentless demand for tertiary enrollments. Governments mandated their flagship universities to enroll far beyond their carrying capacities. New regional institutions were founded and tertiary technical colleges were granted university status. Nigeria, for example, had founded 86 federal and state universities by 2015. Even with increases in funding, African higher education budgets lagged behind enrollment gains. Thousands of African academics left to find work elsewhere.
So what was to be done? In 2001, the World Bank reemphasized the universities' role in national development. After years of neglect, Western foreign aid programs retargeted higher education. Private funders returned; the "Partnership for Higher Education," for instance, which engaged eight American foundations with universities in nine African countries, invested $440 million between 2000 and 2010. African governments began to charter more private universities and technical schools. In Ghana, for example, there were just two private universities in 1999, but now there are 28.
The Expansion of Christian Universities
Christian higher education has played a salient role in this rapid private growth. Nigeria has chartered 61 private institutions since 1999. Of these, 31 are Christian. In Kenya, there are 17 chartered private universities and 13 more with interim authority. Of all these, 17 are Christian. This trend is quite dynamic across the continent. Indeed, sub-Saharan Africa is one of the "hot spots" in the growth of Christian higher education worldwide.
From a broad social and educational viewpoint, this Christian university movement seems driven by the massive demand for access to higher education and the liberalization of government chartering, both global trends. The religious scene in Africa, however, provides its own drivers of this movement. It is part of a larger effort to institutionalize, and thus conserve, the huge gains in Christian adherence. Christian groups in Africa often look first to the educational needs of their children, but they also move quickly to train clergy. In 1950, there were only perhaps 70 or 80 pastoral education programs or theological schools across As Christian movements become strong national forces, their educational aims are broadening to engage larger social responsibilities.
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Africa, but a recent survey found 1,468 of them. As Christian movements become strong national forces, their educational aims are broadening to engage larger social responsibilities. Universities are a better fit than seminaries for these broader purposes, and more than a dozen of the new African universities have seminary or Bible college ancestry. Church people start these universities so their own youth can flourish, but the institutions also aim to build up the nation. Most are open to enrollees beyond their own young people.
Challenging Mandates
The Christian universities face some of the same challenges that confront other African universities. From the state's perspective, they exist to provide broader access, so their chartering often mandates steep enrollment increases and rapid development of new programs and campus facilities. Bowen University, a Baptist-founded institution in Southern Nigeria, opened with 500 students in 2002 and now enrolls 5,000. Covenant University, founded in 2002 by the Nigerian Pentecostal megachurch Winner's Chapel, now has 15,000 students. Uganda Christian University, an Anglican institution founded in 1997, now has more than 10,000 students. Officials cite rapid growth as both a blessing and a challenge; added tuitions help their budgets but strain their ability to recruit adequate instructors and add sufficient facilities.
Other challenges stem from Christian educational mandates. These institutions announce Christian purposes and perspectives for learning nonreligious subjects and they structure campus life to reflect Christian norms. Yet most of them welcome qualified students regardless of faith. Students might chafe at taking courses in religion and having religious orientations infused into what most of society sees as nonreligious subjects. Some are frustrated by chapel or behavior codes. Part-time professors, so common to African universities generally, do not see why their teaching might need to be different in a Christian context. State officials have decided to accommodate religious educational partners, but wonder why hiring criteria, curricular development, or student norms need to be different on Christian campuses.
These new Christian universities are very dynamic places, and their leaders express high hopes that they will help their nations flourish. But one of the main themes of higher education history has been secularization. Broad state purposes inevitably rub against religious particularity, even in highly religious Africa. Even so, Christian universities persist in the West and are rising up afresh in other realms. It is too soon to predict the trajectory of the African wing of the worldwide Christian university movement, but one cannot miss its growing presence and emerging challenges. I n 2018, Latin American universities will commemorate the centennial of the Córdoba University Reform. This movement, and its aftermath, changed the idea of the university in Latin America, and ushered in an era of optimism about the social relevance of universities at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Latin American Universities: Stuck in the Twentieth Century
Marcelo Knobel and Andrés Bernasconi
Universities have indeed played a role in the social, political, cultural, and economic development of Latin America, but have somehow fallen short (as has the region's development, generally). The twenty-first century finds higher education in a process of radical change, throughout North America, Europe, Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East, forging new "social contracts" with the communities that sustain them. Universities in Latin America, in contrast, seem firmly entrenched in a twentieth century mindset, discourse, and repertoire of functions.
Why is this so? Why are Latin American universities rarely places of radical innovation, stellar research performance, or forward-looking projects?
Latin American Universities: Shaped by Accretion
The first universities in the region were founded in the Spanish colonies during the sixteenth century. Their legacy of scholastic teaching and authoritarian governance persisted for the most part after independence and into the nineteenth century. After freedom from Spain and Portugal in the first decades of the eighteenth century, the universities embodied a model that awkwardly combined the Hispanic medieval tradition of Alcalá and Salamanca with the French Imperial University.
A turning point came at the beginning of the twentieth century, as the University of the Republic in Uruguay allowed students to participate in collegiate bodies. Expectations for university reform were expressed at the First International Congress of American Students in 1908 in Montevideo, and later in Córdoba, Argentina, the place of the historic university reform of 1918. Cogovernance by faculty, students, and graduates, a fledgling research mission, and concern with social problems, were championed as means to shake up the lethargic mores of the traditional university.
The ideology of Córdoba, along with an emerging middle class, the political engagement of faculty and students, the development of research capacity, and (more recently) massification and diversification, piled with little or no design on top of the "Scholastic-Napoleonic" tradition. As a result, the ethos of the Latin American university reflects layers of disparate social pressures, political agendas, international influences, and internal developments. In older Latin American universities, one can see in the heterogeneity of professors, students, structures, functions, glories, and grievances, the evidence of this "geological" sedimentation, layer upon layer, of different ideas of the university.
The Region and its Universities Today
Most of the region's universities are rather new. In Brazil, the first bona fide universities were not created until the 1930s, more than 400 years after the Portuguese founded the colony (in 1531) and more than a century after Brazil had become an independent nation (in 1822). The late start was amply balanced by a rapid buildup of faculty cadres and research capacity that has put Brazilian universities at the apex of scientific output in the region.
Latin American higher education consists of close to 6,000 public and private postsecondary institutions. While only 15 percent qualify as universities, they account for approximately 70 percent of the region's tertiary enrollment. They serve almost 500 million inhabitants in 19 countries, with an annual population growth rate of about 2.1 percent and improving life expectancy.
While the most prestigious public and private universities (usually the oldest) represent a small component of each national system, what happens in them, with them, and to them has critical relevance to the system as a whole. Largely, they serve as benchmarks for the rest, train faculty for most of the system, execute the bulk of research, educate the larger part of the social and political elites, and shape national consciousness, cultural identity, and social cohesion. Today, as flagships, they should stand out and lead, but, for the most part, they don't-they preside. Past achievements and reputation are the basis of the continuing influence and respect they command.
Common Challenges
At the risk of generalization, there are characteristics common to these flagship universities that explain why they find it so difficult to transition comfortably to the twentyfirst century, and reimagine their mission and commitment to future generations.
First is the perennial dislocation of the trajectory of universities in the region from the rest of the world. Not only is higher education in Latin America not developing at the same pace as elsewhere, but it often seems to be going against global trends. With few exceptions, governments have pushed institutions (not always wisely) to be more accountable, more effective, more inclusive, more productive, and more efficient. It is the universities, especially the more established ones, that resist change and protect the interests of specific internal constituents. Of course, the fact that the universities ignore reforms taking place elsewhere is not necessarily wrong, but there must be a justification for protecting the status quo. It is unlikely (not impossible, just unlikely) that higher education systems as marginal to the global knowledge stream as those of Latin America, have development strategies unbeknownst to more advanced systems.
Linked to this problem is the obsolescence of the governance structures and practices of most universities that hinders the development of new thinking. In public universities, politically active faculty, often in alliance with students and administrative staff, successfully block attempts to make universities more accountable to stakeholders and purposes other than themselves and their vested interests. Typically, private universities suffer from either too much influence by the founder or from weak governing boards.
Additionally, the younger generation of scholars, often better prepared for research than their predecessors, find it hard to get academic jobs in universities clogged with ageing professors who hesitate to retire, as leaving is often financially ruinous. Worse still is the situation of public universities that must pay pensions for retired professors out of operating budgets. Sadly, career prospects in researchoriented universities are not sufficiently attractive to the best young talent in a competitive global market.
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Universities have indeed played a role in the social, political, cultural, and economic development of Latin America, but have somehow fallen short.
Money is an issue as well; higher education is consistently underfunded throughout the region. But governments are reluctant to increase public investment when institutions are unwilling (or unable) to guarantee that funds are spent transparently and effectively. Thus, it is no surprise that much of the growth has taken place in the private sector. As private institutions become eligible to stake claims on public funding throughout the region, a private vs. public tension has emerged, along with a debate about who pays for what, which public goods are worth subsidizing, what funds should be allocated competitively, what the quality thresholds should be for public money, and other issues.
At the political level, there is a general lack of understanding about the fundamental role higher education systems play in sustainable development. The lack of comprehensive and strategic long-term policies that look beyond the term in office of a government hinders system-level planning and coordination.
Changing the Higher Education Landscape
In truth, higher education systems in Latin America need a complete transformation-a reform that is not a short-term reaction to circumstance, but the result of purposeful deliberation and rational design to guide expansion, provide consistent quality assurance, foster student persistence, support smart diversification, and provide societies with the knowledge-based resources they need.
Some of this is already happening. There are incipient movements toward a diversification of systems in some countries, along with increasing concern for social inclusion and affirmative actions. The region provides some important examples of college-readiness programs, support for retention of students, value-added assessment exams, and more robust information on employability. While the generally poorly regulated expansion of the private sector in the region has raised concerns about quality, the most consolidated new private institutions have contributed some innovation and dynamism to their national systems.
Interestingly, most of this change is taking place outside flagship universities. Institutions that do not find a way to participate, using their intellectual capacity to contribute to, and implement, creative responses to the foreseeable demands of the future, will be left behind by systems that will evolve without them. 
I
t is a time of disruption, in politics and government, in many national economies and cultures. In the United States, disruption has also penetrated the accreditation space, with debates and differences about student achievement, access and affordability, and transparency, topics also challenging quality assurance around the world. Higher education, accreditation, and quality assurance are not immune from the current swirl of competing ideas and views.
Today, US accreditation is undergoing a seismic shift. What has been the primary form of quality assurance and quality improvement in the United States for more than 100 years is being repositioned. It is shifting from an independent, collegial process by which higher education decides and evaluates academic quality on its own, to a compliancedriven process by which external stakeholders decide and apply requirements for quality that accreditors are to use. This shift involves four major changes. The first change is in who provides oversight and takes the lead in accreditation. The second change is in how quality is defined. The third change is about accountability: for what and to whom accreditation is answerable. The fourth is in how accreditation itself is to operate.
Until recently, the complex array of 85 private, nongovernmental institutional and programmatic US accrediting organizations have been operating independently, managing and directing their own work. This continued even as, in the 1950s, accreditors became engaged with the US federal government to serve as a reliable authority about quality in higher education. Accreditors, working with their institutions and programs, defined quality. They were accountable to these institutions and programs and developed their key accreditation practices with the institutions and programs.
New and Different Oversight of Accreditation
The first major change is that the US federal government has now taken on primary oversight of accreditation, overlaying the longstanding independent operation of these organizations. Government is expanding and deepening its examination of how accrediting organizations operate. It is now probing the performance of accrediting organizations based on its-not accreditors'-expectations of the effectiveness of accredited institutions and programs. This presence of government in accreditation or quality assurance is Number 88: winter 2017 not unusual in many countries. It is unusual for the United States, given that accreditation emerged from higher education, not government, and that accrediting organizations remain nongovernmental.
A Different Definition of Quality
Government taking the lead in accreditation also means that government, not accreditation, is taking the lead in how quality is defined, the second major change. This is in contrast to relying on the definitions of quality that accreditors have been using for many years, reflected in standards that are required to achieve accredited status. The standards constitute a broad array of expectations about an institution or program, including mission, financial resources, academic standards, curricula, support services for students, and facilities. For accreditation, quality has been about having resources and processes essential to achieving institutional or program mission at a high level of performance.
With government defining quality, this concept is narrowed and is now about whether students graduate, obtain employment, and have manageable debt from their student loans. This is a shift from the broad, inclusive concept of quality of accreditation to a utilitarian, or pragmatic, definition that ignores the vital role of higher education in intellectual development, in encouraging civic engagement and societal commitment.
For What and to Whom is Accreditation Accountable?
This leads us to the third major change in the accreditation space: the response to "For what, and to whom, is accreditation accountable?" "Accountable for what" is about accreditation now answerable for this different definition of quality as graduation, jobs, and limitations on debt. Accountability is now focused, above all, on protecting and serving students for economic well-being and mobility. If a school is accredited, students should graduate in a timely way, should be able to get jobs, and should have debt that is manageable. Accreditors are to be accountable for timely identification and action against poorly performing schools. They are to be accountable for identifying, and taking action with schools that are engaged in questionable recruiting and marketing activities.
"Accountable for whom" is about accreditation now expected to be answerable, first and foremost, to constituents outside higher education-students, government, and the public. It is now no longer enough for accreditors to be accountable to the institutions and programs they review and the higher education community generally, as in the past. Accountability to the broad public arena is emerging as the primary lens through which accreditation is judged. If, for example, an accrediting organization claims to be doing a good job, but if the institutions it accredits graduates few students or has other difficulties, the accrediting organization itself is judged as lacking. What institutions and programs judge as effective accreditation is being superseded by the judgment of the public.
Accreditation Operation No Longer the Same
For much of its history, accreditation has relied on two stout pillars for its review: institutions and programs selfreporting on their quality and effectiveness, accompanied by peer review or academics validating the reporting. The fourth major change is that these pillars of accreditation are no longer viewed as providing adequate information and a sound basis for accreditation to judge academic quality. Especially in the case of institutional accreditation, self-report and peer review are now considered less reliable. These practices are continuing, but, increasingly, there are calls for self-report and peer review to be augmented by external verification of data and information. In addition, government and the public are calling for documentation of specific levels of performance of institutions and programs, going beyond the typical accreditation review that has focused primarily on resources and process.
Conclusion
This, then, is the disruption in the US accreditation space. Accreditation is no longer fully in charge of its own operation; it is using a definition of quality that it did not establish and may not support; it is accountable for this quality first to the public and not itself; some of its basic features of operation are no longer considered adequate and are being augmented. Accreditation is being repositioned from a process of quality review created and directed by higher education as means of examining its quality, to a process now led and directed by government, to examine how well higher education provides for graduation, jobs, and minimal debt.
From the perspective of those who welcome and even encourage the disruption, accreditation will be seen as doing a better job, more focused on what students and the public need. For those whose emphasis is on the strength and value of accreditation as it has been: an independent Number 88: Winter 2017
For much of its history, accreditation has relied on two stout pillars for its review: institutions and programs selfreporting on their quality and effectiveness, accompanied by peer review or academics validating the reporting.
enterprise of peer review and quality improvement, accreditation will have been seriously impaired. However, this disruption is perceived, accreditation will continue to be central to quality review, but in a significantly different way.
The Importance of Polytechnics for Africa's Development
Goolam Mohamedbhai
Goolam Mohamedbhai is former general secretary of the Association of African Universities. E-mail: g_t_mobhai@yahoo.co.uk. I n the United Kingdom, polytechnics had been in existence since the nineteenth century, but they gained prominence in the 1960s. Their main objective was to provide skilled technical and engineering manpower to promote industrialization. They differed from universities in several ways: they required somewhat lower entry qualifications; they offered mainly subdegree programs that were less rigorous academically and more practically and vocationally oriented; they had close links with industry; and the limited research they undertook was very applied in nature. This division between the polytechnics and universities came to be known as the "binary divide" in higher education. Later, UK polytechnics started running degree programs but their degrees were awarded by a separate, independent body, since they had no degree-granting power.
In 1992, the United Kingdom decided to convert all its polytechnics to degree-awarding universities. One reason for this move was to provide greater opportunities to socially disadvantaged students to access universities; another was that the United Kingdom was moving toward a serviceoriented economy and needed more graduates. Thus ended the binary divide, although many have argued that the divide between the pre-and post-1992 universities never really disappeared.
Replication in Africa
In Africa, most of the former British colonies, as they achieved independence in the 1950s and 1960s, adopted a binary higher education system similar to what then prevailed in United Kingdom, and both polytechnics and universities were created.
In South Africa, which developed the most advanced higher education system in Africa with generous funding under the apartheid regime, the polytechnics were known originally as colleges of advanced technical education, until 1979 when they were renamed technikons. In 1993, perhaps following what was happening in the United Kingdom, South Africa decided to allow all its technikons to provide degree programs and confer degrees, but they retained their practical orientation and demarked themselves from the universities. They became known, regionally and internationally, as exemplary institutions for quality technical training. A major change occurred in 2004 when South Africa decided to convert all its technikons into universities, the first country in Africa to do so. Some became universities of technology; others were merged with existing universities. Many academics and higher education policy analysts, in South Africa and elsewhere, regarded that move to be erroneous, believing that the technikons were playing an important role in the industrial development of the country.
Other African countries followed suit. In 2007, Ghana proposed a law to convert its ten polytechnics into technical universities by September 2016, a law that was hotly debated in the country, with several leading Ghanaian academics voicing their concern at the proposal. But in August 2016, the government went ahead and six of the ten polytechnics were converted into universities. Kenya also decided to upgrade several of its polytechnics and technical institutes to university colleges. Nigeria, which has the largest tertiary education sector in Africa, is moving along the same polytechnic conversion path. Even the Commonwealth Association of Polytechnics in Africa (CAPA) has now changed its name to the Commonwealth Association of Technical Universities and Polytechnics in Africa. What is of concern is that, in most countries, no new institutions have been, or are being created, to replace the upgraded polytechnics, leading to a serious skills gap in human resources.
Importance of Polytechnics
The importance of the polytechnics can be gauged by considering the engineering profession. It is usually accepted that for the effective operation of the engineering industry, there is need for a far greater number of technicians than professional engineers, the desirable ratio engineers:technicians being of the order of 1:5.
Precise data on the employment situation in engineering in African countries are not available, but estimates seem to indicate that, in a wide range of engineering disciplines, that ratio in Africa is of the order of 1:1 or 1:1.5. There is even a risk that the ratio will worsen, as the countries upgrade their polytechnics to university status. This indicates the acute shortage of engineering technicians and it has led, in many countries, to graduate engineers being underemployed and having to work as technicians.
While Africa unquestionably needs an increased pool of excellent professional engineers, it equally needs an even greater number of practically trained, versatile technicians, not only to support the professional engineers, but equally to service and initiate small-and medium-scale industries, in order to create employment, improve the quality of life, and make fuller use of local resources. A major constraint, however, is the status of technicians. They are regarded as inferior to engineers, which is one of the reasons for the tendency to upgrade polytechnics and technical colleges to university status.
Polytechnics Conversion Policy
The dilemma facing sub-Saharan Africa is that, on the one hand, it has the lowest tertiary education enrollment (currently around 9 percent) compared to any other world region. It is therefore under enormous pressure to increase its enrollment, and it is doing so by either increasing its university intake or creating new universities, usually by upgrading its existing polytechnics. On the other hand, however, almost all African countries are facing the serious challenge of graduate unemployment, although precise statistical data of its magnitude in different countries is lacking. There is no evidence that graduates from universities would have better employment opportunities than those of polytechnics-on the contrary, the real need in Africa at present is for trained manpower at the technical and middle management level, which polytechnics are in a better position to provide. The justification for converting polytechnics to universities is therefore questionable.
One country that is currently reviewing its policy on polytechnics is Mauritius. At the beginning of the twentyfirst century, Mauritius had two public universities and two polytechnics. In 2010, in order to implement the government policy of "one graduate per family," the two polytechnics were merged to create a new university. An open university was also set up and construction was started for establishing three additional public university campuses in different regions of the country. In 2015, however, a newly elected government reversed the latter decision and decided that the three university campuses would be used for creating polytechnics, not universities. The two main reasons that guided that decision were the increasing unemployment of graduates and the dire shortage of middle management and technical skills in the country that was hampering the development of the small and medium enterprises sector.
A Way Forward
Although tertiary enrollment in Africa needs to be significantly increased, that increase should not be in the university sector alone. Differentiation of the tertiary education sector is vital for Africa's development. Universities will continue to play a vital role in Africa's development, but the equally important role of polytechnics must be recognized. It is time, therefore, for African governments to seriously reconsider their policy of upgrading their polytechnics to universities, or to create appropriate institutions to replace the converted polytechnics, as in the case of Mauritius.
African countries should also undertake a thorough assessment of their skills needs in their various priority development sectors before embarking on any major review of their tertiary education sector policy. Hardly any African country has carried out such an exercise, and it is not an easy task. Under its Partnership for Skills in Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology (PASET) project, the World Bank, in partnership with the Korea Development Institute, is assisting several African countries in undertaking such an assessment.
The Humanities and Social Sciences in the Age of STEM: The Struggle of Japanese as a Linguistic Minority
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Disputes about the Humanities and Social Sciences in Japan
In 2015, the Japanese government and universities were involved in serious disputes about the relevance of humanities and social sciences. The national universities, which A major change occurred in 2004 when South Africa decided to convert all its technikons into universities, the first country in Africa to do so.
are public institutions directly funded by the government, received a ministerial notice asking them to restructure their programs in education and in humanities and social sciences, in order to fit the contemporary needs of learners and society. The detailed rationale behind this notice was not clearly stated, at least when the first notice was released. This policy, however, was based on numerous formal and informal discussions during recent national reviews of the mission of university education, initiated by the national government to identify the various functions of national universities. Under the established norms of academic freedom and university autonomy in Japan, there is a strong consensus that universities should have major institutional autonomy, while the government makes general recommendations concerning plans and directions.
Not surprisingly, opinion leaders in the humanities and social sciences reacted quite negatively. Some argued that this signaled the suicide of Japanese civilization, while others criticized the government notice as an unjustifiable intervention in university autonomy. The government argued that these criticisms were based on a misunderstanding of its intentions. To be fair, many of the national universities had admitted the necessity of reorganizing their programs in the humanities and social sciences even before the official notice was issued. Many national universities published plans to reduce student enrollment and the allocation of teaching staff in humanities and social sciences by reorganizing schools and departments. Meanwhile, some university leaders, such as the president of Kyoto University, stressed the importance of the humanities and social sciences.
Prioritization of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) for Global Competition
What made national universities implement these reorganizations in the end? Needless to say, nobody, including the national government, is against humanities and social sciences, which are indispensable sources of national intellectual and cultural identity. The structural background of these reform proposals was by no means a result of the humanities and social sciences being considered "useless" or "inefficient."
The Japanese government is continuously facing financial challenges. The government carries an extraordinarily large national debt, and the ageing of the population is a long-term problem for the national economy. The ministry of finance and cabinet-level national strategic committees are continuously proposing budgetary reallocations from schools and higher education-serving a decreasing youth population-to public support for the increasing elderly population.
Japan's research performance in the fields of STEM is losing its leading position, due to the rapid development of the research capacity of neighboring Asian countries. The national government is concentrating public investment on a limited number of research universities in order to maintain their international rankings, which are mostly based on research performance in the STEM fields. Indeed, the visible downturn in the research performance in STEM in the national universities is already widely recognized: the talent pool necessary to sustain Japan's research competitiveness at the top universities is shrinking.
Japan has a large private higher education sector, and the majority of undergraduate students in the humanities and social sciences are studying at private universities that rely heavily on income from tuition fees. Except for a small portion of public investment into academic research and postgraduate education to foster the next generation of academics, the necessity of public investment in university education in the humanities and social sciences is not widely acknowledged.
There is strong doubt in society about the value of university education in the fields of the humanities and social sciences. Most of the criticism is superficial. There is also wide and profound confusion about the nature of liberal arts and general education, and their relations with humanities and social sciences as specialized academic disciplines. Overall, however, even among university academics, there is an undeniable tendency to treat the humanities and social sciences as supplementary components to the development of science and technology.
A Critical Turning Point in the Age of STEM
The current priority given by Japanese society to STEM fields over humanities and social sciences is not new. Investments in both research and education in the public higher education system have always been concentrated on the STEM fields, even among top comprehensive universities. In particular, during World War II, the government, and indeed the whole of Japanese society, concentrated resources on science and technology education and research, and withdrew resources, including human talent (students Number 88: Winter 2017 In Japan, there is a strong tendency to consider the international dimension of higher education in a context of competition, rather than collaboration and mutual understanding. What is different now from 70-80 years ago, is the domination of English as academic lingua franca, including in many neighboring East Asian countries, where academics trained in English-speaking countries play leading roles even in the humanities and social sciences. The humanities and social sciences in Japan still maintain a good international reputation, based on the long-term accumulation of high-quality publications through the tradition of academic freedom and the autonomous development of thought and knowledge. These publications are also accessible to a wide range of citizens, as they are written in Japanese. However, many, including authors of science policy reports in both government and academic communities, admit that social sciences and humanities in Japan are relying heavily on absorbing overseas intellectual work through translation. At the same time, academic work written in Japanese by the vast majority of academic staff of universities in Japan in the fields of humanities and social sciences have little impact on international knowledge dialogues. Limited publication in English in these fields is becoming a serious obstacle to the further development of the humanities and social sciences in Japan.
Considering the rapid development, both in quantity and quality, of academic publications in national languages in East Asia (especially in the Greater China region), it is unlikely and undesirable that English as an academic language should continue to monopolize fields such as the humanities and social sciences, which are deeply rooted in multilinguistic and multicultural activities and values. In Japan, there is a strong tendency to consider the international dimension of higher education in a context of competition, rather than collaboration and mutual understanding. This is, of course, related to the deep and long-term connection between national universities and the governmental agenda for national development, which does not always fit the twenty-first century concept of a globally relevant research university, free from national control. Moreover, a very limited shift of resources from the humanities and social sciences to the STEM fields will never lead to any improvement in the research performance of Japanese universities, without a concomitant and substantial increase in public and social investment.
